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TRADITIONAL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
HELPS KEEP INDEPENDENT CRAFT BEER 
VIABLE 
Daniel J. Croxall 
ABSTRACT—Independent craft breweries contributed approximately $68 
billion to the national economy last year. However, an arcane regulatory 
scheme governs the alcohol industry in general and the craft beer industry 
specifically, posing both obstacles and benefits to independent craft 
brewers. This Essay examines regulations that arguably infringe on free 
speech: namely, commercial speech regulations that prohibit alcohol 
manufacturers from purchasing advertising space from retailers. Such 
regulations were enacted to prohibit undue influence and anticompetitive 
behavior stemming from vertical and horizontal integration in the alcohol 
market. Although these regulations are necessary to prevent global 
corporate brewers from dominating the craft beer market at the expense of 
independent craft beer and consumer choice, evolving commercial speech 
doctrine threatens to invalidate them due to a trend towards increased 
protections for commercial speech. Without these regulations, and many 
others like them, nothing would restrain global corporate brands from 
engaging in illegal pay-to-play conduct to regain lost market share and 
force independent craft beer from the shelves and tap handles. 
 
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills, McGeorge School of 
Law; Director, Capital Lawyering Concentration. Thank you to Paige 
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INTRODUCTION 
Independent craft beer is on a roll.1 Sales and market share are up; 
popularity continues to rise. To illustrate, the independent craft beer 
industry contributed $67.8 billion to the U.S. economy in 2016 and 
provided more than 456,000 jobs.2 A mere four years prior, in 2012, 
independent craft beer contributed $33.9 billion and 360,000 jobs.3 The 
growth has been incredible. Most experts agree that the craft beer segment 
will continue to grow, but perhaps not at the same pace.4 There is a fly in 
the IPA, however, that could significantly curtail growth and diminish 
independent craft beer’s presence in the market. Global corporate beer 
 
 1 For purposes of this article, “independent craft beer” means any beer manufacturer that is not 
owned or controlled by a major corporation such as Ab InBev, MillerCoors, Molson Coors, 
Constellation Brands, Heineken, and the like. 
 2 See Economic Impact, BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/economic-
impact-data [https://perma.cc/BH38-CCBP]. 
 3 See Press Release, Brewers Association, Craft Brewers’ Economic Contribution Reaches $34 
Billion (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/craft-brewers-economic-
contribution-reaches-34-billion/ [https://perma.cc/NQW3-6YT8]. 
 4 See Keith Gribbins, 2017 Mid-Year U.S. Craft Beer Analysis: 5% Growth Shows a Slowing, 
Maturing Market, CRAFT BREWING BUS. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/
featured/craft-beer-growth-shows-slowing-maturing-market [https://perma.cc/E395-Z2ZH]. 
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brands such as AB InBev, MillerCoors, Constellation Brands, and 
Heineken (commonly referred to as “Big Beer”)5 have been losing market 
share since the craft beer revolution began in the mid- to late-2000s and 
would like nothing more than to recover those losses by any means 
necessary. 
The laws and regulations surrounding California’s craft beer industry 
provide a stark example of how changes in First Amendment commercial 
speech doctrine can have real, potentially unintended, consequences. 
California’s craft beer industry benefits from existing commercial speech 
regulations that are designed to prevent vertical and horizontal integration 
in the alcoholic beverage market, as well as to ostensibly promote 
temperance in California drinkers. There are several such restrictions in 
California’s tied-house laws.6 These enactments are important to maintain a 
competitive beer market and prohibit financial dealings that would render 
the retail arm of the market beholden to the manufacturing arm. 
As just one specific example, California prohibits alcoholic beverage 
manufacturers from purchasing advertising space from a retailer.7 Major 
breweries with interests adverse to independent craft breweries8 have hotly 
contested this restriction and have directly challenged it using the 
 
 5 To provide some context, in 2016 three global corporate brewers, AB InBev, MillerCoors, and 
Constellation Brands, controlled 75.6 percent of the U.S. beer market, and the five largest brewers 
manufactured 83 percent of the U.S. beer market. See Major Suppliers Shipments and Share 2016 v. 
2015, BEER MARKETER’S INSIGHTS, https://www.beerinsights.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=
item&id=19559:major-supplier-shipments-and-share-2016-vs-2015&tmpl=component 
[https://perma.cc/J4TA-EYU7]. 
 6 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 23001, 25500 (West 2016) (preventing, among other 
restrictions, makers of alcoholic beverages from owning an interest in a retail business which sells such 
beverages). Generally speaking, tied-house laws prohibit an alcoholic beverage manufacturer from 
exerting any influence or control over a retailer for the purpose of preventing vertical and horizontal 
integration in the alcoholic beverage industry, as well as to ostensibly promote temperance. See id. 
 7 See id. § 25503(h). 
 8 The Brewers Association is the leading industry trade group concerning independent craft beer. It 
defines a craft brewery as follows: (1) “Small: Annual production of 6 million barrels of beer or less 
(approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual sales). Beer production is attributed to a brewer according to 
the rules of alternating proprietorships”; (2) “Independent: Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is 
owned or controlled (or equivalent economic interest) by a beverage alcohol industry member which is 
not itself a craft brewer”; (3) “Traditional: A brewer that has a majority of its total beverage alcohol 
volume in beers whose flavor derives from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their 
fermentation. Flavored Malt Beverages (FMBs) are not considered beers.” See Craft Brewer Defined, 
BREWERS ASS’N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/craft-brewer-defined 
[https://perma.cc/E389-QZDQ]. To put this into perspective, the vast majority of craft breweries 
produce less than 1,000 barrels of beer annually. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: ALCOHOL & 
TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU, NUMBER OF BREWERS BY PRODUCTION SIZE - CY 2016 (2017), 
https://www.ttb.gov/statistics/production_size/2016_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EJ2A-EN4D]. 
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commercial speech doctrine under the First Amendment.9 The Federal 
Alcohol Administration Act has a similar restriction.10 
That prohibition, and laws like it in other jurisdictions, are in jeopardy 
and are the subject of a potential circuit split. Traditionally, commercial 
speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny.11 However, since at least 2011 
and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,12 commercial 
speech case law has been trending towards heightened protection beyond 
that provided in the traditional Central Hudson “intermediate scrutiny” 
test.13 In Sorrell, the Supreme Court at the very least suggested that 
commercial speech deserves the same level of protection against regulation 
as noncommercial speech.14 Opponents of craft beer’s increasing market 
share momentum were quick to recognize that Sorrell opened the door for a 
challenge to California’s prohibition described above. And challenge they 
did.15 But the Ninth Circuit recently held en banc that Sorrell did not 
require a heightened level of scrutiny for commercial speech regulations 
other than the already “intermediate” level of scrutiny required by Central 
Hudson.16 The Fourth Circuit (and others) might not agree.17 For the 
moment, however, craft brewers in the Ninth Circuit can rest safe knowing 
 
 9 See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2016) overruled by Retail 
Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 
830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 10 See 27 U.S.C. § 205(b)(4) (2000) (making it unlawful for any manufacturer or wholesaler “[t]o 
induce through any of the following means, any retailer . . . by paying or crediting the retailer for any 
advertising, display, or distribution service . . . .”). Indeed, federal tied-house regulations prohibit 
payments to retailers for advertising in several places. See 27 C.F.R. § 6.52 (2018) (prohibiting 
manufacturer and wholesaler payments for advertisements placed by a retailer); 27 C.F.R. § 6.54 (2018) 
(prohibiting purchase of advertising in retailer publications); 27 C.F.R. § 6.55 (2018) (prohibiting 
reimbursements to retailers for product or other displays); and 27 C.F.R. § 6.56 (2018) (prohibiting 
renting display space at a retailer). Federal permits require manufacturers and wholesalers to adhere to 
state and federal alcohol laws, including comprehensive trade practice regulations to ensure the 
independence of alcohol retailers. 
 11 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 12 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 13 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Regulating Marijuana Advertising and 
Marketing to Promote Public Health: Navigating the Constitutional Minefield, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 14 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64 (“On its face, Vermont’s law enacts content- and speaker-based 
restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information. . . . The statute thus 
disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular content. More than that, the statute disfavors 
specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufacturers.”). 
 15 See, e.g., Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1120–21 (C.D. Cal. 
2013) (challenging California laws against vertical and horizontal integration in the beverage market). 
 16 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 17 See Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(recognizing that Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny is likely not the same as the heightened 
scrutiny the Supreme Court contemplated in Sorrell). 
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that Big Beer cannot squeeze them out of the market by simply purchasing 
advertising space from retailers. The same cannot be said for independent 
craft brewers in other circuits. 
If commercial speech regulations are eventually held to something 
stricter than Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny as the general trend 
suggests, the constitutionality of many existing tied-house regulations that 
impact commercial speech is in jeopardy, if not entirely predetermined. 
This Essay proceeds in six parts. Part I summarizes tied-house laws 
prohibiting alcohol manufacturers from purchasing advertising space from 
retailers, particularly Section 25503(h) in California. Part II explains how 
traditional intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech has been applied to 
Section 25503(h). Part III explains that judicial momentum has been 
trending towards increased protections for commercial speech since at least 
2011 based on language in Sorrell. Part IV explores how the Ninth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Retail Digital Network v. Prieto18 bucks the 
trend and upholds Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny analysis. Part V 
argues that this decision helps independent craft beer remain viable. 
Finally, Part VI argues that abandoning Central Hudson for some further 
heightened scrutiny will significantly injure the independent craft beer 
industry. 
I. THE REGULATION AT ISSUE: ALCOHOL MANUFACTURERS CANNOT 
PURCHASE ADVERTISING SPACE FROM RETAILERS 
After Congress repealed Prohibition through the Twenty-First 
Amendment, every state adopted and implemented some version of what 
are known as “tied-house” laws.19 In their purest form, tied-house laws are 
designed to prevent any ownership interests between the three tiers of 
alcohol manufacture, distribution, and sale.20 Their purpose is to prevent the 
pre-Prohibition evils associated with saloons that were owned or heavily 
beholden, operated, and supplied by a single alcohol manufacturer with the 
sole purpose of selling the most owner-produced alcohol as possible—
consumer choice and temperance be damned.21 In short, a retail outlet (a 
“house”) could easily become beholden to a manufacturer and push only 
that manufacturer’s products through ownership, gifts, business support, 
 
 18 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 19 See Tied House: Pillar of Alcohol Regulation, COMPLIANCE SERV. OF AM.,  
http://www.csa-compliance.com/articles/tied_house-_pillar_of_alcohol_regulation 
[https://perma.cc/DN66-UD5B]. 
 20  RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL 72–73 (1933). 
 21 Id. 
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low-interest loans, and outright payments.22 And competition was fierce—
beyond fierce. Alcohol manufacturers would stop at nothing to ensure that 
drinkers guzzled as much of their product as possible.23 Indeed, the phrase 
“there is no free lunch” is often credited to pre-Prohibition U.S. saloons.24 
Tied-houses would offer thirsty lunch crowds a “free lunch” if they 
purchased beer or other alcoholic beverages during the lunch session.25 
Manufacturers’ thirst for alcohol sales was truly unquenchable. 
After the U.S. Congress ratified the Twenty-First Amendment, 
California adopted its original Alcohol Beverage Control Act (the “Act”) in 
1953, including its own version of tied-house restrictions.26 The legislature 
adopted the Act for the following seemingly antiquated reasons: (1) “for 
the protection of the safety, welfare, health, peace, and morals of the people 
of the State”27; (2) “to eliminate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful 
manufacture, selling, and disposing of alcoholic beverages”28; and (3) “to 
promote temperance in the use and consumption of alcoholic beverages.”29 
More specifically, the Ninth Circuit recognized that California adopted 
these restrictions “(1) to prevent large-scale manufacturers and wholesalers 
of alcoholic beverages from dominating local markets for their products 
through vertical and horizontal integration; and (2) to promote and curb 
‘excessive sales of alcoholic beverages’ by prohibiting the ‘overly 
aggressive marketing techniques’ that had been characteristic of large-scale 
alcoholic beverage concerns.”30 
As part of the Act, California enacted Business and Professions Code 
Section 25503.31 In particular, Section 25503(h) provides that no alcoholic 
beverage manufacturers or their agents shall “[p]ay money or give or 
furnish anything of value for the privilege of placing or painting a sign or 
advertisement, or window display, on or in any premises selling alcoholic 
beverages at retail.”32 It is important to note what Section 25503(h) does 
not do—it does not prohibit manufacturers from advertising in retail 
 
 22 Id. at 73. 
 23 See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 20, at 42 (1933). 
 24 See, e.g., Jan Whitaker, Lunch and a Beer, RESTAURANT-ING THROUGH HISTORY (Sept. 6, 2011) 
https://www.restaurant-ingthroughhistory.com/2011/09/06/lunch-and-a-beer/ [https://perma.cc/Y3PM-
CJGF] (explaining that saloons providing free lunches is a very old custom). 
 25 Id. 
 26 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23000 (West 1953). 
 27 See id. § 23001. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 31 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (West 1973). 
 32 Id. § 25503(h). 
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outlets.33 It simply prohibits manufacturers from providing any 
compensation in exchange for advertising.34 
Section 25503(h) creates obvious First Amendment concerns in that it 
prohibits otherwise lawful speech to some degree. Many wonder why the 
state would enact such a broad restriction. The California Supreme Court 
provided a general answer in 1971: 
 
In the era when most tied-house statutes were enacted, state legislatures 
confronted an inability on the part of small retailers to cope with pressures 
exerted by larger manufacturing or wholesale interests. Consequently, most of 
the statutes enacted during this period (1930–1940) manifested a legislative 
policy of controlling large wholesalers; the statutes were drafted in 
sufficiently broad terms, moreover, to insure the accomplishment of the 
primary objective of the establishment of a triple-tiered system. All levels of 
the alcoholic beverage industry were to remain segregated; firms operating at 
one level of distribution were to remain free from involvement in, or influence 
over, any other level.35 
 
Thus, California and the various state legislatures sought to prohibit 
market domination that can minimize consumer choice and lead to 
intemperance. And one avenue to do so was to prohibit the influence that a 
manufacturer paying for retail advertisements would have over that retailer. 
“[S]ection 25503(h) is primarily designed to prevent or limit a specific evil: 
the achievement of dominance or undue influence by alcoholic beverage 
manufacturers and wholesalers over retail establishments.”36 Section 
25503(h), however, has not gone unchallenged, and its future existence 
(and the existence of similar state regulations) is all but clear. 
 
II. THE TRADITIONAL COMMERCIAL SPEECH ANALYSIS: CENTRAL 
HUDSON’S INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY APPLIED TO SECTION 25503(H) 
Since the mid-1970s, commercial speech has received some 
protections under the First Amendment.37 While content-based 
 
 33 Indeed, manufacturers are allowed to give retailers promotional materials for free with some 
limitations. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 106 (1973). 
 34 Id. There are some exceptions. For example, sports stadiums and music venues. See CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 25503.26 (West 2001). 
 35 Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control App. Bd., 487 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 
1971) (citations omitted). 
 36 Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 37 See Jacobs, supra note 13. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
8 
noncommercial speech regulations must survive strict scrutiny, commercial 
speech regulations—an innately content-based category of speech—must 
only survive intermediate scrutiny.38 This disparity stems from a long-held 
belief that commercial speech is generally of lower value than 
noncommercial speech, and commercial speech regulation is more 
appropriate based on the government’s power to regulate commerce.39 As a 
result, commercial speech regulations are more likely to survive legal 
challenges than noncommercial speech regulations. 
The Supreme Court has traditionally applied a four-part analytical 
framework to review commercial speech restrictions to achieve 
intermediate scrutiny.40 Those four parts are as follows: (1) the speech 
“must concern lawful activity and not be misleading”; (2) the government 
interest must be substantial; (3) the regulation must “directly advance” the 
“asserted” government interest; and (4) the regulation must not be “more 
extensive than is necessary to serve” the asserted interest.41 If these four 
queries are satisfied, the regulation will survive the challenge. If one is 
unmet, the regulation will fail. 
Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, a 1986 Ninth Circuit case, provides a concrete 
example of Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny and involves a direct 
challenge to Section 25503(h).42 In that case, the plaintiff Actmedia leased 
advertising space on shopping carts and placed beer manufacturers’ ads on 
those spaces.43 Coors contracted with Actmedia to advertise Coors beer on 
shopping carts in certain California stores.44 The California Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Board (ABC) decided that this agreement violated 
Section 25503(h) and initiated an administrative action against Coors; thus, 
Coors terminated its agreement with Actmedia.45 In response, Actmedia 
filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief that (1) Coors’s conduct did not 
violate Section 25503(h) and (2) Section 25503(h) violated the First 
Amendment by impermissibly restricting commercial speech.46 The District 
Court found for the California ABC, and Actmedia appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit.47 
 
 38 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 39 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63. 
 40 Id. at 566. 
 41 Id. 
 42 830 F.2d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 961. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 958. 
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Applying Central Hudson, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.48 The court 
specifically found that Section 25503(h) materially and directly advances 
California’s interests in preventing market dominance because it prevents 
manufacturers and wholesalers from circumventing the three-tiered system 
and thus concealing illegal payments for “advertising” when in reality such 
payments equate to “payoffs.”49 The court stated it as follows: “By flatly 
proscribing such payments, California minimized the possibility that 
alcoholic-beverage manufacturers and wholesalers will obtain undue 
influence over retail establishments, resulting in increased vertical and 
horizontal integration of California’s liquor industry.”50 Regarding the 
fourth Central Hudson factor, which requires that the regulation must not 
be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interest, the court 
found that Section 25503(h) was as “narrowly drawn as possible to 
effectuate” California’s interest in preventing illegal payoffs and, to some 
extent, temperance.51 Accordingly, the court held that because Section 
25503(h) “prohibits only paid advertising in retail stores, not unpaid 
advertising in those stores or paid advertising anywhere else,” it survived 
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test.52 
So while Section 25503(h) survived intermediate scrutiny, it is no 
easy test. And when juxtaposed with the rational basis test, Central Hudson 
already employs a “heightened” form of scrutiny. But since the Supreme 
Court decided Central Hudson in 1980, several opinions have cast doubt on 
its efficacy and trended towards increased protections for commercial 
speech.53 Perhaps none of them have caused such consternation and 
speculation as the 2011 case of Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., which placed 
Actmedia’s ruling in jeopardy.54 
 
 48 Id. at 965–68. The first Central Hudson factor was not at issue because there was no dispute that 
the Coors advertisements concerned lawful activity. Also, the second factor was not at issue because 
California has a substantial interest in exercising its Twenty-First Amendment powers and in regulating 
the structure of the alcoholic beverage industry in California. Id. at 965–66. 
 49 Id. at 967. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 968. 
 53 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a statutory ban on 
the advertising of liquor prices violates the First Amendment). 
 54 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Hunter B. Thomson, Whither Central Hudson? Commercial Speech in the 
Wake of Sorrell v. IMS Health, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 171, 192–99 (examining cases with 
differing views of Sorrell’s change to, or lack thereof, the commercial speech doctrine). 
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III. SORRELL’S TRAIL OF BREADCRUMBS 
In Sorrell, the Supreme Court struck down a Vermont statute that 
restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records for marketing 
purposes.55 There were two major issues in Sorrell. One issue was whether 
the statute was a commercial “speech” regulation or whether it was 
commercial regulation of a commodity or conduct.56 The Court ultimately 
held that the dissemination, use, or availability of information is “speech.”57 
For the second issue, the Court explored the First Amendment implications 
of this type of speech regulation.58 Rather than staying within the 
parameters of the Central Hudson commercial speech doctrine, the Court 
discussed concerns that traditionally extend into the noncommercial speech 
arena, such as whether a regulation is content-based.59 Surprisingly, and 
contrary to Central Hudson, the Sorrell Court stated that “heightened 
scrutiny” should be used for content-based commercial speech 
restrictions.60 But all commercial speech regulations are inherently content-
based, and the traditional Central Hudson commercial speech test is an 
intermediate scrutiny test.61 Despite these groundbreaking statements, the 
Court did not bother to test drive or even define “heightened scrutiny” in 
this context because the law at issue in Sorrell could not pass Central 
Hudson’s less challenging intermediate scrutiny test as it stood.62 
The Sorrell opinion contains several hints that “heightened scrutiny” 
signals a departure from the traditional intermediate scrutiny test, and it 
could be an omen for the end of the commercial speech doctrine 
 
 55 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
 56 Id. at 567–71. 
 57 Id. at 570–71. 
 58 Id. at 563–66, 571–72. 
 59 Id. at 563–67. 
 60 Id. at 565–66. The Court at the very least suggested that the term “heightened” as used in the 
opinion was either strict scrutiny or akin to it. See id. (citing cases applying strict scrutiny). The Court 
specifically noted that “[t]he Court has recognized that the ‘distinction between laws burdening and 
laws banning speech is but a matter of degree’ and that the ‘Government’s content-based burdens must 
satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000)). Further, “[t]he First Amendment requires heightened 
scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the 
message it conveys.’” Id. at 566 (citations omitted). Of course, content-based bans typically require a 
strict scrutiny analysis. Id. 
 61 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 62 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571–72. 
113:1 (2018) Cheers to Central Hudson 
11 
altogether.63 If so, Section 25503(h) and similar laws in other jurisdictions 
would likely be deemed unconstitutional.64 
Sorrell does not follow the previously established commercial speech 
framework under Central Hudson. The commercial speech test is entirely 
distinct from any other First Amendment analysis.65 Terms like “content-
based” and “speaker-based,” commonly employed during a strict scrutiny 
analysis of noncommercial speech restrictions, are not typically used in the 
commercial speech test.66 Commercial speech even has its own branch of 
precedent, starting with Central Hudson, which veers away from core First 
Amendment case law.67 Yet, the Sorrell Court approached what should 
have been a straightforward commercial speech case more like a 
noncommercial speech case. 
Immediately after introducing the phrase “heightened scrutiny,” the 
Sorrell Court cited an unusual assortment of cases.68 First, the Court cited 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,69 a case that suggested, without precedent 
or much explanation, that a content-based commercial speech restriction 
might be treated differently than a content-neutral commercial speech 
restriction.70 The Sorrell Court also cited Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. FCC71 to support the “heightened scrutiny” concept, but the Court’s 
subsequent parenthetical described Turner as “explaining that strict 
scrutiny applies to regulations reflecting ‘aversion’ to what ‘disfavored 
speakers’ have to say.”72 Neither Discovery Network nor Turner defined 
“heightened scrutiny”—Discovery Network applied Central Hudson 
 
 63 See Thomson, supra note 54, at 199 (“If Sorrell is to be taken seriously and its ideas applied 
consistently in subsequent cases, however, then the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
speech cannot stand.”). 
 64 See infra Part VI. 
 65 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 66 Id. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (applying strict 
scrutiny and holding that “[o]ur precedents teach these principles. Where the designed benefit of a 
content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right 
of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists.”). 
 67 Id.; see, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183–86 (1999) 
(applying the Central Hudson test to a government prohibition against radio and television 
advertisements for casinos); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475–81 (1989) 
(applying the Central Hudson test to a law prohibiting commercial enterprises from operating public 
university facilities). 
 68 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565–66 (2011). 
 69 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 70 Id. at 428 (considering whether to apply Central Hudson or the time, place, and manner test to a 
commercial speech restriction). 
 71 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 72 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
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intermediate scrutiny73 and Turner applied an intermediate scrutiny known 
as “O’Brien” scrutiny that applies to content-neutral restrictions that have 
an incidental burden on speech.74 The only common theme between the two 
cases appears to be a mutual concern about whether restrictions are 
content- or speaker-based,75 a concern which fits more squarely into a core, 
noncommercial speech analysis. 
The Court continued its comprehensive First Amendment 
discussion—a discussion that normally would be unnecessary in a 
commercial speech case—by citing several other noncommercial speech 
cases, like R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,76 Ward v. Rock Against Racism,77 and 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres.78 The Central Hudson test—the bedrock of 
the commercial speech doctrine—is nowhere in the Court’s initial 
discussion.79 In fact, Sorrell’s first mention of commercial speech reads like 
a side note: the Court states that a regulation designed solely to restrict 
speech would be unconstitutional, adding, “[c]ommercial speech is no 
exception.”80 Thus, at least initially, the Court effectively merged 
commercial speech into a noncommercial speech analysis. 
The Sorrell Court ultimately chose to apply Central Hudson because 
“the outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a 
stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”81 The key is the “or.” The 
Court clearly referenced two different tests side-by-side, which cuts against 
the theory that Central Hudson and “heightened scrutiny” are the same. 
Additionally, Central Hudson is the sole, longstanding test for commercial 
speech—there was no need for the Sorrell Court to reach further. 
Therefore, hinting at a second test was probably not an accident, and it is 
equally unlikely that the Court’s words were superfluous. 
The Sorrell Court also repeatedly emphasized the high value of 
commercial speech, almost as if to advocate for equal treatment between 
commercial and noncommercial speech—another seeming departure from 
established commercial speech doctrine. For example, the Court stated, “[a] 
‘consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be 
far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.’”82 The Court also 
 
 73 Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 416. 
 74 Turner, 512 U.S. at 641–42. 
 75 Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 428–29. 
 76 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 77 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 78 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 79 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564–66 (2011). 
 80 Id. at 566. 
 81 Id. at 571 (emphasis added). 
 82 Id. at 566 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)). 
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pointed out that in the field of medicine and public health, “information can 
save lives.”83 It continued, “[t]he commercial marketplace, like other 
spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and 
information flourish. . . . [T]he general rule is that the speaker and the 
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information 
presented.”84 In glaring contrast to the dissenting opinion and the status 
quo, the Sorrell Court never framed commercial speech as a lesser form of 
speech; rather, the Court continually pushed the idea that commercial 
speech can be just as valuable as noncommercial speech. At least by 
inference, this weakens the long-held belief that commercial speech should 
be less protected than noncommercial speech. 
The Sorrell dissent reinforces the theory that the majority was 
breaking new ground. The dissent was concerned that the majority 
proposed “a standard yet stricter than Central Hudson” without any 
precedent for this new test.85 Unlike the majority, the dissent expressly 
concluded that commercial speech must have less protection because it 
often crosses paths with commerce, the regulation of which is within the 
power of the legislature, and it thus should not be inhibited by heightened 
levels of scrutiny.86 The dissent also suggested that the Sorrell majority 
misused words from First Amendment jurisprudence—like “content-
based,” “content-neutral,” and “speaker-based”—that do not belong in a 
commercial speech analysis.87 According to the dissent, the majority 
reached its conclusion “without taking full account of the regulatory 
context, the nature of the speech effects, the values these First Amendment 
categories seek to promote, and prior precedent.”88 The dissent’s concerns 
support the idea that Sorrell hinted at a stricter standard for commercial 
speech, which might—to the chagrin of the dissent—implicate the 
regulation of commerce and “open[] a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment 
challenges.”89 
 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 579 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)). 
 85 Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 86 Id. at 583–85, 589–91. 
 87 Id. at 588, 602. 
 88 Id. at 602. 
 89 Id. 
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IV. A CHALLENGE TO SECTION 25503(H) POST SORRELL: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S RETAIL DIGITAL NETWORK TRILOGY AND UNCERTAINTY IN ITS 
SISTER CIRCUITS 
Given that Actmedia was the law of the Ninth Circuit since 1986 and 
upheld Section 25503(h), Sorrell provided another chance to challenge 
restrictions against alcohol manufacturers paying for advertising space. 
One case, Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith,90 shows how Sorrell 
created confusion about whether it modified the commercial speech 
landscape enough to finally overturn Section 25503(h) and allow alcohol 
manufacturers to purchase advertising space from retailers.91 
A. The RDN District Court: Sorrell Is Nothing New 
Retail Digital Network, LLC (RDN) installed liquid crystal display 
advertisements and contracted with entities and individuals seeking to use 
that medium to advertise in retail outlets.92 But RDN had trouble securing 
contracts with alcohol manufacturers because those manufacturers were 
concerned about violating California Business & Professions Code sections 
25503(f), (g), and (h)93—the same statute sections upheld 29 years earlier in 
Actmedia.94 To remedy this, RDN brought suit against the California 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC).95 RDN argued that Actmedia 
was no longer binding because Sorrell’s intervening “heightened scrutiny” 
test rendered sections 25503(f), (g), and (h) unconstitutional.96 
The district court upheld Actmedia, and saved the statute yet again 
because it decided that Sorrell was consistent with the Central Hudson 
analysis used in Actmedia.97 The court came to this conclusion by 
emphasizing Sorrell’s adherence to Central Hudson: (1) Sorrell cited cases 
that apply Central Hudson; (2) the Sorrell Court itself applied Central 
Hudson; (3) the Court did not define heightened scrutiny; and (4) the 
Sorrell dissent considered heightened scrutiny to be a suggestion rather 
 
 90 945 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
 91 Given the potentially huge ramifications, the craft beer industry watched this case closely and 
several trade groups filed amicus briefs. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Amici Curiae Brief by the 
California Craft Brewers Association and Brewers Association, Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 
861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (No. 13-56069), 2016 WL 7210480, at *1–2 (supporting the district 
court decision upholding Section 25503(h)). 
 92 Appelsmith, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1121. 
 93 Id. 
 94 830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra Part II. 
 95 Appelsmith, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 1120. 
 96 Id. at 1124. 
 97 Id. at 1125. 
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than a holding.98 Finally, the court decided that even if Sorrell did establish 
a new test, heightened scrutiny would not apply because Section 25503 was 
not a complete speech ban.99 For all these reasons, the district court found 
that Sorrell was not “clearly irreconcilable” with the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Actmedia.100 
B. The Appeal: Sorrell Announced a New Standard 
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s opinion.101 The appellate court held that Sorrell’s heightened 
scrutiny was clearly irreconcilable with Central Hudson and remanded the 
case to analyze Section 25503 with “heightened” scrutiny.102 The court also 
hinted that it would be difficult for Section 25503 to survive under 
Sorrell’s potentially new standard.103 
In interpreting heightened scrutiny, however, the appellate court 
circled back to Central Hudson.104 The court explained that “[h]eightened 
judicial scrutiny may be applied using the familiar framework of the four-
factor Central Hudson test,” albeit with stricter third and fourth prongs.105 
According to the court, the third prong of Central Hudson became more 
demanding as applied in pre-Sorrell cases.106 And the fourth prong became 
a two-part process that first considers the actual legislative purpose of the 
law107 (as opposed to asserted interests or post hoc rationalizations), and 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 1125–26. 
 101 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2016), overruled by 
Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 653. 
 104 Id. at 648. 
 105 Id. at 648–49. 
 106 Id. at 648. The court stated that Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny changed the third prong of Central 
Hudson; now “the government bears the burden of showing ‘that the harms it recites are real and that its 
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.’” Id. at 648 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing 
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995)). This is different than the original Central Hudson verbiage, which 
required the government to show that the restriction “directly advances the government’s asserted 
interest,” but RDN’s reformulation of the third prong is not from Sorrell. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The RDN court pulls the direct quote from 
Rubin, and the quote was nowhere in the Sorrell opinion. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487. 
 107 Appelsmith, 810 F.3d at 648 (citing Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060–61 
(D. Ariz. 2012). The court derived its new first step of the fourth prong from a district court case in 
Arizona, not from Sorrell. Id. The Friendly House court, like the RDN court, believed that by saying 
“drawn to achieve” an interest, the Sorrell Court was creating a fourth prong that literally looks at the 
history of the law to see if it was “drawn” to achieve the interest asserted by the government. Friendly 
House, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1061 (“The fact that [the laws at issue] were created as part of a package of 
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then considers whether the law is reasonably drawn to fit that purpose 
using methods that predate Sorrell.108 
Despite asserting that Sorrell justifies its version of heightened 
scrutiny, the three-judge panel’s elaborate interpretation cannot be fairly 
traced back to Sorrell, especially considering that the Sorrell Court said 
almost nothing about heightened scrutiny. Perhaps because of these 
irregularities, the Ninth Circuit stepped in to hear the case en banc. 
C. The En Banc Opinion: Sorrell Is Nothing New, or Is It? 
After its en banc review, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the three-
judge panel.109 The Ninth Circuit decided that Sorrell did not say anything 
new at all: Sorrell did not add a “content-based” threshold question, 
“heightened scrutiny” is not a novel concept, and therefore Central Hudson 
stands unchanged.110 Using this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s reliance on Actmedia’s holding that Section 25503 survived 
Central Hudson.111 The en banc court, however, did put a chip in 
Actmedia’s holding: it rejected California’s interest in temperance as a 
justification for the law,112 perhaps signaling yet another challenge strategy. 
Yet the Ninth Circuit’s opinion ignored Sorrell’s trail of breadcrumbs 
leading to stricter scrutiny for commercial speech regulations. For example, 
the court relied on Sorrell’s citation to Discovery Network, but it 
overlooked the litany of noncommercial speech case references within 
Sorrell.113 Also, the court believed that Sorrell stood for the proposition that 
 
statutes . . . related to unlawful immigration also weighs against a finding that the provisions are ‘drawn 
to’ address a traffic problem.”). 
 108 Appelsmith, 810 F.3d at 648–49. The new second step of the fourth prong does not come from 
Sorrell either; this “narrowly tailored” requirement is a well-worn formulation of the fourth prong that 
has been refined over time in cases like Fox. Id. at 648–69 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of 
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). The fourth prong required a reasonable and proportional fit to 
the government’s interest long before Sorrell. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. Like the “new” third prong, this 
part of the fourth prong is not new, and the Sorrell Court never connected it to heightened scrutiny. 
 109 Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 841–42 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 110 Id. at 846. 
 111 Id. at 842. 
 112 Id. at 841–42. The court cast a pall on any argument that temperance is a sufficient justification 
to ban paid advertisements: “Even assuming that promoting temperance is a substantial interest, 
Actmedia erroneously concluded that Section 25503(h) directly and materially advances that interest by 
‘reducing the quantity of advertising that is seen in retail establishments selling alcoholic beverages.’” 
Id. at 851 (quoting Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 1986)). Moreover, “[i]f 
California sincerely wanted to materially reduce the quantity of alcohol advertisements viewed by 
consumers, surely it could have devised a more direct method for doing so.” Id. Accordingly, using 
temperance as a justification for infringements on commercial speech appears to be fruitless going 
forward. Temperance, after all, is one of the primary reasons the ABC Act exists. See CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1953). 
 113 Prieto, 861 F.3d at 848. 
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commercial speech deserves lesser protection,114 but that contradicts 
Sorrell’s recognition of the high value of commercial speech. And although 
the court admitted that Sorrell’s “the outcome is the same” language 
suggested that the Court entertained the idea of a stricter test, the Ninth 
Circuit still brushed off the possibility of separate tests.115 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit took the default escape hatch: it justified 
using Central Hudson because Sorrell used Central Hudson.116 But 
Sorrell’s effect on commercial speech doctrine is an open question. As 
Chief Judge Thomas, RDN’s lone dissenter, wrote: “Of course, the ultimate 
determination as to whether Sorrell altered the Central Hudson test is 
entirely up to the Supreme Court. However, I think the most reasonable 
reading of Sorrell is that it did.”117 
While the Ninth Circuit seemingly resolved the issue for its own 
jurisdiction, none of its sister circuits have ruled on the matter. Until the 
Supreme Court speaks to whether Sorrell modified the Central Hudson 
standard, commercial speech regulations like Section 25503 are in grave 
danger. As a result, independent brewers are at risk in those jurisdictions. 
As set forth below, Central Hudson must remain the relevant standard if 
independent craft beer is to continue thriving. 
D. Disagreement in the Other Circuit Courts and Potential Danger to 
Regulations Prohibiting the Purchase of Advertising 
The Ninth Circuit is currently the only circuit court that has ruled on 
whether Sorrell created a new test for commercial speech regulations. And 
even the Ninth Circuit reversed its view within a two-year period.118 Other 
circuit courts have been less than clear with respect to whether Sorrell 
announced a new test or whether it simply recognized that Central Hudson 
already requires a “heightened” scrutiny.119 None of the circuits seem to 
fully agree, and whether restrictions like Section 25503(h) will survive 
legal challenges depends heavily on each circuit’s reading of Sorrell. If the 
circuit agrees that Sorrell did not change Central Hudson, such restrictions 
 
 114 Id. at 849. 
 115 Id. at 848. 
 116 Id. at 849. (“In any event, because Sorrell applied Central Hudson, there is no need for us to 
‘craft an exception to the Central Hudson standard.’”) (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476, 482 n.2 (1995)). 
 117 Id. at 852 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting). 
 118 Id. at 841–42 (majority opinion). 
 119 Compare United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpreting Sorrell as 
adding an inquiry of whether the regulation was “content- and speaker-based”) with Educ. Media Co. at 
Va. Tech., Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2013) (differentiating heightened scrutiny 
under Sorrell from intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
18 
will likely stand. But the converse is also true. If a circuit interprets Sorrell 
to require a new, heightened scrutiny above Central Hudson’s test, 
prohibitions on alcohol manufacturers from purchasing advertising space 
will likely be deemed unconstitutional. 
More specifically, circuit courts have sensed the significance of 
Sorrell, but those courts, sans the Ninth Circuit, have struggled to 
understand “heightened scrutiny” and its effect on commercial speech law. 
The result is a spectrum of inconsistent interpretations.120 
To illustrate, in United States v. Caronia,121 the Second Circuit 
interpreted Sorrell as adding a threshold question to the Central Hudson 
analysis: Is a commercial speech regulation content-based?122 Regarding 
heightened scrutiny, the Caronia court stated “[t]he Court [in Sorrell] did 
not decide the level of heightened scrutiny to be applied, that is, strict, 
intermediate, or some other form of heightened scrutiny. Rather . . . the 
Court concluded that the Vermont statute was unconstitutional even under 
the lesser intermediate standard set forth in Central Hudson.”123 Thus, the 
Second Circuit recognized that “heightened scrutiny” as used in Sorrell 
might mean something new, but it did not explicitly recognize a new 
standard. 
The Eighth Circuit suggested a similar understanding in 1-800-411-
Pain Referral Service, LLC v. Otto.124 In that case, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that the Supreme Court did not define “heightened scrutiny,” but instead of 
leaving the term undefined, the Eighth Circuit decided that “[t]he upshot is 
that when a court determines commercial speech restrictions are content- or 
speaker-based, it should then assess their constitutionality under Central 
Hudson.”125 Essentially, the Eighth Circuit appears to believe that 
“heightened scrutiny” and Central Hudson are the same. 
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit readily accepted that heightened 
scrutiny and Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny are different—it even 
suggested that heightened scrutiny might be strict scrutiny.126 Referencing 
Sorrell, the Fourth Circuit stated that “the Court did not actually apply 
‘heightened scrutiny,’ striking the ban under Central Hudson alone.”127 The 
court continued that, like the Sorrell Court, “we need not determine 
 
 120 See Thomson, supra note 54, at 192–98. 
 121 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 122 Id. at 163. 
 123 Id. at 164 (citations omitted). 
 124 744 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech., Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 127 Id. 
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whether strict scrutiny is applicable here . . . we too hold that the 
challenged regulation fails under intermediate scrutiny set forth [in] 
Central Hudson.”128 Thus, there is no clear, definitive ruling outside of the 
Ninth Circuit regarding the viability of Central Hudson and the relationship 
between heightened and strict scrutiny. 
V. WHY SECTION 25503(H) MATTERS TO INDEPENDENT CRAFT BEER 
So what do these constitutional standards have to do with craft beer? 
The negative impact that heightened scrutiny for commercial speech 
regulations would have on independent craft beer cannot be overstated. 
Over the last ten years, Big Beer has consistently lost market share to 
independent craft beer.129 Independent craft beer’s growth has been 
exponential. To illustrate, in 2011, independent craft beer represented 5.7% 
volume of the total U.S. beer market.130 In 2016, independent craft beer’s 
volume share rose to 12.7%.131 Big Beer is not happy about this and is 
doing everything it can to quell the losses.132 If courts subject regulations 
like Section 25503(h) to a scrutiny higher than Central Hudson, they would 
likely fail.133 If manufacturers are allowed to purchase advertising space 
from retailers, Big Beer would receive a powerful weapon to regain its lost 
market share and essentially force independent brewers off the shelves of 
many retailers.134 
There are several reasons why Section 25503(h) and the Central 
Hudson test benefit independent craft beer and must remain in effect to 
preserve its market share. But the most prominent are that (1) point-of-
 
 128 Id. 
 129 See Chris Crowell, Craft Beer Market Share Hits 12 Percent of Total Beer, CRAFT BREWING 
BUS. (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/news/craft-beer-market-share-hits-12-
percent-of-total-beer/ [https://perma.cc/S7QS-6AZP] (“‘For the past decade, craft brewers have charged 
into the market, seeing double digit growth for eight of those years,’ said Bart Watson, chief economist, 
Brewers Association.”)  
 130 See Press Release, Brewers Ass’n, Craft Continues to Brew Growth, (Mar. 11, 2013), 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/brewers-association-craft-continues-to-brew-growth/ 
[https://perma.cc/V5B5-ESX3]. 
 131 See Bart Watson & Julia Herz, National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data 
[https://perma.cc/97A3-6U4G]. 
 132 See, e.g., Kate Taylor, The Battle Between Big Beer and Craft Brewers Is Getting Ugly, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/big-beer-vs-craft-beer-battle-gets-
ugly-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/7FVH-VKJG] (discussing how large breweries have taken measures such 
as mocking craft breweries in advertisements and acquiring small breweries).  
 133 See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638, 651–53 (9th Cir. 2016) 
overruled by Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (pointing 
out several difficulties Section 25503(h) faces under a heightened scrutiny). 
 134 See infra Part V.A. 
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purchase (POP) advertising is extremely powerful and can be manipulated 
to favor Big Beer; (2) Big Beer’s prior pay-to-play market conduct, though 
illegal,135 suggests that Big Beer would gladly use “advertising” payments 
to squeeze independent beer from the shelves and tap handles or use those 
payments to purchase favorable treatment rather than advertising; and (3) 
allowing manufacturers to purchase advertising creates an untenable 
environment for regulators, thus inviting corruption of the market. 
A. The Power of POP Advertising 
Big Beer would love nothing more than to take back its lost market 
share. One way to do so is to outspend independent craft brewers with an 
aim towards prominent retail placement.136 Without Section 25503(h)’s 
protections and assuming that Big Beer actually paid for advertising space 
(not influence), Big Beer would absolutely dominate retail sales, minimize 
consumer choice, and negate the stated purposes behind state alcoholic 
beverage control statutes.137 The power of POP advertising is that strong. 
Several studies confirm that POP advertising has an enormous impact 
on consumers. In 2016, the Path to Purchase Institute (PTPI)138 conducted 
the 2016 Point of Purchase Trends Survey, in which it surveyed several 
hundred consumer packaged goods (CPG) companies’ marketing 
executives and their relevant data, including Johnson & Johnson Consumer, 
General Mills, Hunter-Douglas, and many other household names. In 
pertinent part, the data demonstrate that POP advertising increased sales by 
19% for permanent displays and 23.8% for temporary displays of any given 
 
 135 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503(c) (West 1973) (prohibiting secret rebates and 
concessions to retailers from suppliers); id. § 25600 (West 2018) (prohibiting free gifts, premiums, 
refunds, and advertising specialties (among other things) to retailers from suppliers); CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 4, § 106 (1973). 
 136 The vast majority of independent craft brewers brew less than 1,000 barrels per year, whereas 
Big Beer typically brews millions of barrels per year. Thus, this is truly a David versus Goliath scenario 
when it comes to advertising budgets. The Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau’s figures from 
2016 show that of 5,096 operating breweries in the US, 3,283 produced between 1 and 1,000 barrels of 
beer. Number of Brewers by Production Size, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: ALCOHOL & TOBACCO TAX & 
TRADE BUREAU (revised Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.ttb.gov/statistics/production_size/
2016_brew_prod_size_ttb_gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ECV-NLX3]. To put this into further perspective, 
the Brewers Association reports that in 2015, roughly “90% of the breweries in the country, more than 
3,000 breweries put together, have less than half the capacity of a single MillerCoors facility in Golden, 
CO.” Bart Watson, Craft Brewer Capacity, BREWERS ASS’N, (Apr. 23, 2015) 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/craft-brewer-capacity/ [https://perma.cc/JJ4P-CKQ7]. 
 137 See infra Part V.B. 
 138 PTPI is a retail industry trade group that conducts studies and education about retail marketing. 
See About Us, PATH TO PURCHASE INST., https://p2pi.org/about [https://perma.cc/T7LV-GLML]. 
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products.139 This is no small number, especially given that independent craft 
beer only made up 12.7% of the overall U.S. beer market in 2016.140 POP 
advertising’s effectiveness is not a new concept to Big Beer; indeed, this 
study found that AB InBev is the third most admired merchandise and 
branding in America, behind only Proctor & Gamble and Coca-Cola.141 
Consider that Coca-Cola is allowed to pay for advertising in retail outlets, 
and no law prevents a soda seller from selling only Coca-Cola products. 
Consumers regularly find themselves in a Coca-Cola only retail outlet, but 
that is precisely the core purpose of the California ABC Act—to prevent 
vertical and horizontal integration in the alcohol market.142 
Other studies confirm these percentages. According to a 2016 study 
by the Shop! Association, 76% of all purchase decisions are made in-store 
and 68% of all in-store purchases are impulse driven.143 Manufacturers 
know how to manipulate these percentages through product placement, 
shelf space, and plain-old marketing ingenuity. For example, Guinness 
increased its U.K. sales in 2006 by 27% simply placing large replica 
Guinness-filled pint glasses on the sides of shelf displays in retail outlets 
and making them visible from every point in the beer aisle.144 Through 
simple but effective POP advertising, Guinness retained its loyal customers 
and encouraged new ones to impulsively purchase the product.145 
Courts in the alcohol context have recognized that POP advertising 
can greatly improve sales. Specifically, in Actmedia, the Ninth Circuit cited 
to a 1977 study of “consumer purchasing tendencies” at retail outlets that 
specifically focused on POP advertising and conclusions about consumer 
influence concerning alcohol brands.146 That study, by the Power of 
 
 139 See Bill Schober, The 2016 P-O-P Trends Survey, PATH TO PURCHASE INST., http://p2pi.org/
sites/default/files/2016_POPTrends_WP_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SGF2-5XKC]; see also John 
Quelch & Kristina Cannon-Bonventre, Better Marketing at the Point of Purchase, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Nov. 1983), http://hbr.org/1983/11/better-marketing-at-the-point-of-purchase [https://perma.cc/8TZ7-
LXAQ]. 
 140 See National Beer Sales & Production Data, supra note 131. 
 141 Schober, supra note 139. 
 142 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23001 (West 1953); Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 959 
(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 
 143  SHOP! ASS’N, A DISPLAY IS A TERRIBLE THING TO WASTE: EXAMINING P.O.P. COMPLIANCE 
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Purchase Institute, and the E.I. DuPont Company, concluded that POP 
advertising is indeed effective. 
The study concluded that supermarket customers make 64.8% of their 
decisions concerning which brand of product to purchase once they are 
already in the supermarket.147 For alcoholic beverages, this percentage is 
67%: 61% for beer, 74.7% for wine, and 81.2% for spirits.148 The study also 
concluded that display advertising increases the number of customers 
purchasing the advertised brand six times for beer, thirteen times for wine, 
and thirty-nine times for hard liquor.149 
Accordingly, while a substantial increase in Big Beer POP advertising 
is unlikely to sway the dedicated craft beer consumer to the same extent as 
an average beer drinker, it would certainly have some detrimental impact 
on independent craft beer’s continued expansion and it would perhaps 
recoup some of Big Beer’s losses. Most independent craft brewers cannot 
afford to pay for such advertising, let alone the amounts Big Beer can 
afford to spend. The result would almost certainly reduce consumer choice, 
move the beer market towards integration, and make it more difficult for 
independent brewers to sell their products. 
B. Pay-to-Play and the Illusion of Choice 
In response to its lost market share to independent craft beer, Big Beer 
has engaged in an interesting two-front war to regain its losses. On one 
front, Big Beer has attempted to minimize the appeal of independent craft 
beer with a series of tactics and strategies aimed at discrediting the 
independent craft beer movement.150 On a second front, Big Beer has 
employed an “if you can’t beat ’em, join ’em” approach, purchasing 
numerous former craft breweries and adding them to the Big Beer 
portfolio.151 Both strategies would be emboldened if Big Beer were allowed 
to purchase advertising from retailers. 
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Pay-to-play conduct is illegal.152 Specifically, under California 
Business and Professions Code Section 25503(c), manufacturers cannot 
“[g]ive secret rebates or make any secret concessions to any licensee or the 
employees or agents of any licensee, and no licensee shall request or 
knowingly accept from another licensee secret rebates or secret 
concessions.”153 Similarly, Section 25600(a)(1) states that “[n]o licensee 
shall, directly or indirectly, give any premium, gift, or free goods in 
connection with the sale or distribution of any alcoholic beverage.”154 And 
the California ABC extended the definition to include any “thing of 
value.”155 Most, if not all, states contain similar restrictions.156 
Even though pay-to-play is illegal, Big Beer and its distributors are 
not afraid to engage in such conduct. For example, the California ABC 
settled a yearlong investigation of AB InBev and a distributor in 2015.157 
The ABC found that AB InBev covered the cost of or partially financed 
refrigeration units, television sets, and draught systems for several retailers 
in Southern California.158 AB InBev settled the matter for $400,000—one 
of the largest fines that the ABC has ever imposed. This sounds like a great 
result.159 To put it into perspective, that $400,000 fine (enough to put most 
independent breweries out of business) amounted to roughly 3% of the 
profits AB InBev made in one single day at the time—$12,602,739.160 At 
that price point, engaging in pay-to-play simply appears to be a cost of 
doing business. In short, even though providing things of value (like 
draught systems, televisions, or payments) is illegal,161 the cost is negligible 
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to Big Beer. The obvious result is that retailers who receive such free gifts 
are then obligated to push the gift giver’s product to the detriment of other 
manufacturers and the consuming public at large. 
This is not a regional phenomenon. Boston has long been the subject 
of pay-to-play and anticompetitive scandals in the alcohol industry.162 
Specifically, in May 2017, the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverages Control 
Commission charged that AB InBev gave nearly $1 million worth of illegal 
incentives, including refrigeration equipment, to Boston-area retailers.163 
The upshot is that pay-to-play conduct is more common than laypersons 
might imagine, especially in the face of increased market share loss.164 
Despite its illegality, pay-to-play happens in large and small scale across 
the country. 
Direct pay-to-play agreements aside, one might argue that even if Big 
Beer were allowed to purchase advertising space from retailers and thus 
curry favor (like shelf space and prominent placement), that should not 
have an impact on independent craft breweries because the products are so 
different that they are not truly in competition. That argument fails. First, 
the more Big Beer can squeeze independent craft breweries out of the 
shelves and tap handles, the harder it is for the independent brewer to move 
product. Retailers only have so much shelf space or tap handles. 
Second, Big Beer creates further confusion with its newly purchased 
“craft” breweries. If a retailer wanted to sell “craft” beer but was beholden 
to a Big Beer manufacturer because of anticompetitive payments or gifts, 
that retailer would simply fulfill its reciprocal obligation to its Big Beer 
patron by offering the patron’s “craft” beer—or at least giving it better 
treatment. Otherwise, the retailer could be in breach of the agreement or 
lose its lucrative patronage. 
This is where POP advertising comes to the forefront as an illusion of 
choice. For example, AB InBev now owns at least ten formerly 
independent breweries or breweries it created to look like independent craft 
breweries.165 Known internally as AB InBev’s “high-end,” these brands 
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include powerhouse breweries Goose Island, Elysian, 10 Barrel Brewing, 
Wicked Weed Brewing, and percentage interests of Kona Brewing and 
Widmer to name a few.166 Similarly, MillerCoors owns several craft-like 
breweries such as Saint Archer Brewing, Hop Valley, Blue Moon, and 
Leinenkugel’s Brewery.167 Heineken owns Lagunitas, and Constellation 
Brands (the company that owns Corona) owns Ballast Point.168 These 
breweries are enormous compared to the average independent craft brewery 
and can be found in most states.169 While exact statistics are nearly 
impossible to find, reports suggest that AB InBev’s high end will produce 
up to 3 million cases of “craft” beer per year in New England alone.170 And 
if these breweries could legally buy influence over retailers through 
advertising payments, retailers would stock on the shelves and tap handles 
with these brands. Thus, many consumers would mistakenly purchase these 
brands, incorrectly assuming that they are purchasing independent craft 
beer. That, it seems, is precisely Big Beer’s goal. 
One last problem: assuming Section 25503(h) and laws like it in the 
other forty-nine states are unconstitutional and manufacturers are allowed 
to pay retailers for advertising space, someone will have to examine those 
advertising agreements to ensure that the compensation provided to the 
retailer was truly for advertising. As noted above, California Business and 
Professions Code Section 25600(a)(1) and California ABC Rule 106 
prohibit a manufacturer from providing any “thing of value” to a retailer.171 
Thus, if payments for advertisements are allowed, they will be an exception 
to the rule. Accordingly, ABC boards will be left to police each and every 
agreement. This raises several untenable issues. 
As an initial matter, the California ABC consists of only twenty-two 
district offices.172 Most other states have even less capacity.173 In 2017, 
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California had 4,657 bars and nightclubs,174 and this does not count liquor 
stores, grocery stores, and other event locations where beer is sold. Absent 
a major increase in funding and personnel, the California ABC is simply 
not equipped to handle reviewing this magnitude of contracts to ensure 
compliance. Perhaps more importantly, the ABC would be put in the 
position of controlling the advertising sales market. The ABC would have 
to tell retailers and manufacturers what constitutes a fair payment for 
advertising and what bleeds into paying for favorable treatment. This 
injection of the government into private party contracts could violate the 
Constitution.175 
Without restrictions on payments for advertising, states would 
essentially be legalizing pay-to-play conduct. Only those manufacturers 
who can afford to pay retailers will reap the rewards of superior product 
placement. Statistically speaking, those products will sell more and thus put 
independent brewers at a significant disadvantage. The more ominous 
examples above also show that the temptation to curry favor with retailers 
through advertising payments would likely lead to more than just product 
placement. Indeed, as is traditionally expected in a pay-to-play relationship, 
retailers would be obligated to treat their patron breweries in a favorable 
manner or risk losing the extra cash flow brought in by advertising sales. 
The result would be less shelf space and fewer tap handles for independent 
craft breweries, and less consumer choice for the beer drinking public. 
Finally, there is no entity or agency in place that is equipped to review, 
analyze, and determine the “adequacy” of any payments or consideration to 
retailers for advertising space. The result would be a regulatory free-for-all 
with no oversight. 
VI. REGULATIONS SUCH AS SECTION 25503(H) WOULD LIKELY FAIL 
UNDER HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 
While the Sorrell Court did not explain a heightened scrutiny test in 
the commercial speech context, the three-judge panel from the Ninth 
Circuit’s Retail Digital Network opinion attempted to do so by tightening 
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Central Hudson’s third and fourth prongs.176 Specifically, the traditional 
formulation of Central Hudson’s third prong is “whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted.”177 But the three-judge 
panel reformulated the prong as follows: the “Government carries the 
burden of showing that the challenged regulation advances the 
Government’s interest in a direct and material way.”178 Similarly, Central 
Hudson’s fourth prong traditionally analyzes “whether the regulation is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”179 But the 
heightened version, at least according to the three-judge panel, requires a 
“fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish 
those ends.”180 In addition, the panel expressed serious doubts as to whether 
Section 25503 could satisfy these requirements on the grounds of 
temperance or vertical and horizontal integration: “[W]e cannot say on the 
record before us that the State’s Prohibition-era concern about advertising 
payments leading to vertical and horizontal integration, and thus leading to 
other social ills, remains an actual problem in need of solving.”181 
Accordingly, the panel thought, based on the district court record, Section 
25503(h) would fail under a heightened scrutiny.182 
While Section 25503(h) ultimately survived Actmedia and the en banc 
opinion in the Ninth Circuit under Central Hudson’s scrutiny, the three-
judge panel’s reformulation, if adopted by other circuits, presents an 
insurmountable hurdle. As an evidentiary matter, the government would be 
hard-pressed to present evidence that Section 25503(h) advances its stated 
goals of prohibiting vertical and horizontal integration and promoting 
temperance in a material way simply because Section 25503(h) has been 
the law for so long. There is no frame of reference for a market in 
California without this restriction. The task would be akin to proving a 
negative. Moreover, as to the fourth prong, proving the desired “fit” 
between the goals and the regulation remains elusive. The proposed test 
would require the government to point to evidence and facts that are not 
ascertainable given that the market simply has not existed without Section 
25503(h) since the pre-Prohibition era. Thus, as an evidentiary matter 
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alone, Section 25503(h) and others like it (including the federal Act183) 
would likely fail under a heightened scrutiny analysis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For now, the Ninth Circuit has resolved the issue of whether Sorrell 
created a scrutiny standard higher than that required by Central Hudson 
with respect to commercial speech regulations.184 Thus, Section 25503(h)’s 
prohibition of manufacturer payments for advertising space in retail outlets 
survives. But that is not the case in every circuit. Indeed, as shown by the 
Retail Digital Network trilogy, even courts in the Ninth Circuit seem 
somewhat unsure of what to do with Sorrell and whether it actually created 
a heightened standard. The bottom line is that Big Beer is making a push to 
take back as much of the national beer market as possible through several 
tactics, like purchasing “craft” breweries to further reduce consumer choice 
and using illegal pay-to-play strategies with retailers. Commercial speech 
regulations like Section 25503(h) help level the playing field such that 
independent craft beer has a chance to compete against endlessly deep 
pockets and questionable business tactics of Big Beer. Without such 
commercial speech regulations, independent craft beer will certainly 
shrink, perhaps disappear, and with it an enterprising industry will be 
swallowed whole. 
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